J.M. Forbes reports possible client-data exposure in email compromise
An employee email account was accessed through social engineering and may have contained names, addresses, SSNs and account numbers.
依企業、國家、產業、發生年份和攻擊方式查詢事件,了解外洩資料、影響範圍、查證狀態、企業應對及來源。
An employee email account was accessed through social engineering and may have contained names, addresses, SSNs and account numbers.
After an IT-environment intrusion, Murata’s April 6 second and April 27 third notices said about 73k employee-related and about 15k external-contact records may have been taken.
After detecting a cloud-server outage on March 11, 2026 and confirming ransomware-style intrusion, the clinic disclosed on April 6 that personal data of 369 patients had been taken.
An employee email account was accessed without authorisation between February 6 and 9, 2026; on February 26 the company found protected health information was accessed, which may include names, dates of birth, medical record numbers and treatment information.
Ransomware on the file server was confirmed early on April 2, 2026 (first notice April 3). The April 14 fourth notice said entrusted partner data may have leaked; the May 20 fifth notice found no clear outbound traces but did not fully rule out access.
On March 25, 2026 an internal mail with a guest CSV was wrongly sent to one contractor employee; deletion was confirmed the same day and disclosed April 3.
From 28 Nov 2024 contractor SocioFuture sent ostensibly cleared templates to another bank with customer data left in hidden sheets; discovered March 27, 2026 after the other bank noticed and disclosed April 3.
After an external tip on March 24, 2026, Awa Bank found its OA test environment had been accessed and customer-related data leaked; disclosed April 3. Separate from live banking systems.
An unauthorised actor used valid credentials to clone third-party partner repositories containing law-firm customers’ client data, including names, addresses, SSNs, government IDs and passport numbers.
An unauthorised party accessed human-resources systems in October 2025 and accessed and obtained records about employees and service providers.
Between February 4 and 7, 2026, support tickets on a third-party customer-service platform were accessed or acquired without authorisation; they included names and medical information.
The network was accessed September 18–19, 2025; files were copied and potentially viewed, including names, SSNs, medical and health-insurance information.
On March 24, 2026, a spike in login attempts was detected as a credential stuffing attack using credentials stolen from other sites; accounts reusing the same credentials may have been accessed, exposing names, email addresses, lookup and order history and partial card details (last four digits, card type).
In September 2025, suspicious activity was identified; an unauthorised actor briefly accessed the server environment and copied certain data.
On November 4, 2025, illumifin identified unusual network activity; an unauthorised person accessed the network and acquired copies of files, which on November 10 were found to possibly contain information received from or on behalf of its clients.
Unauthorised access around January 22, 2026 resulted in a third party obtaining names, contacts, SSNs, government IDs, dates of birth, account numbers and, for some, login credentials.
Possible data leak: Activity from January 25 to February 11, 2026 may have resulted in personal information being copied.
A third-party firewall vulnerability was exploited; names, addresses, contacts, some SSNs and account numbers may have been exposed (unauthorised access confirmed).
A MetLife-seconded worker had improperly given the bank’s life-insurance contract data to MetLife; disclosed March 27, 2026 after MetLife’s report.
In December 2025, the OTC learned of suspicious activity in the OkTAP taxpayer portal; certain W-2 and 1099 files were accessed without authorisation between July 5, 2024 and December 20, 2025, containing names and SSNs.